|
I A M B L I C H U S
ON
The Mysteries
OF THE
EGYPTIANS, CHALDEANS, AND ASSYRIANS.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK
BY
THOMAS TAYLOR
-
Ο δε
Αρισοτελης προς Αντιπατρον περι
Αλεξανδρου γραφων, εφη μη εκεινῳ
-
προσηκειν οτι
πολλων κρατει μεγαφρονειν, αλλ' ουδεν ηττον ει τις ορθως
γινωσκει
-
CHISWICK
- PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM,
COLLEGE HOUSE ;
FOR THE TRANSLATOR, MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH.
1821
|
Introduction |
|
The Epistle of
Porphyry to the Egyptian Anebo |
| Section I. |
The Answer of the Preceptor
Abammon, 21 chapters |
|
Section II. |
On Angels and Daemonae, in 11
chapters |
|
Section III. |
On Divination and the Soul, in
31 chapters |
|
Section IV. |
On Theurgy and Magic, in 13
chapters |
|
Section V. |
On Prayer and Sacrifice, in 26
chapters |
|
Section VI. |
On Divination, in 7 chapters |
|
Section VII. |
Theology of the Egyptians, in 5
chapters |
|
Section VIII. |
On the Egyptian First Cause, in
8 chapters |
|
Section IX. |
On Daemons, in 10 chapters |
|
Section X. |
On Felicity, in 8 chapters |
|
Additional Notes
by Mr. Taylor |
Notes on Taylor's Translation
Notes on this electronic
edition
INTRODUCTION
IT appears to me that there are two descriptions of
persons by whom the present work must be considered to be of
inestimable worth, the lovers of antiquity and the lovers of
ancient philosophy and religion. To the former of these it must be
invaluable, because it is replete with information derived from
the wise men of the Chaldeans, the prophets of the Egyptians, the
dogmas of the Assyrians, and the ancient pillars of Hermes ; and
to the latter, because of the doctrines contained in it, some of
which originated from the Hermaic pillars, were known by
Pythagoras and Plato, and were the sources of their philosophy ;
and others are profoundly theological, and unfold the mysteries of
ancient religion with an admirable conciseness of diction, and an
inimitable vigour and elegance of conception. To (viii) which also
may be added, as the colophon of excellence, that it is the most
copious, the clearest, and the most satisfactory defence extant of
genuine ancient theology.
This theology, the sacred operations pertaining to
which called theurgy are here developed, has for the most
part, since the destruction of it, been surveyed only in its
corruptions among barbarous nations, or during the decline and
fall of the Roman empire, with which, overwhelmed with pollution,
it gradually fell, and at length totally vanished from what is
called the polished part of the globe. This will be evident to the
intelligent reader from the following remarks, which are an
epitome of what has been elsewhere more largely discussed by me on
this subject, and which also demonstrate the religion of the
Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Greeks to be no less scientific than
sublime.
In the first place, this theology celebrates the
immense principle of things as something superior even to being
itself ; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it is
nevertheless ineffably the source ; and (ix) does not, therefore,
think fit to enumerate it with any triad* or order of beings.
Indeed it even apologizes for giving the appellation of the most
simple of our conceptions to that which is beyond all knowledge
and all conception. It denominates this principle however, the one
and the good; by the former of these names indicating its
transcendent simplicity, and by the latter (x) its subsistence as
the object of desire to all beings. For all things desire good. At
the same time, however, it asserts that these appellations are in
reality nothing more than the parturitions of the soul, which,
standing as it were in the vestibules of the adytum of deity,
announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but only indicate
her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and belong rather to the
immediate offspring of the first God than to the first itself.
Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the
supreme, when it ventures not only to denominate it, though
ineffable, but also to assert something of its relation to other
things, it considers this as preeminently its peculiarity, that it
is the principle of principles; it being necessary that the
characteristic property of principle, after the same manner as
other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be
collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle
of all principles.
The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is
deduced is the following. As the principle of all things is the
one, it is (xi) necessary that the progression of beings should be
continued, and that no vacuum should intervene either in
incorporeal or corporeal natures. It is also necessary that every
thing which has a natural progression should proceed through
similitude. In consequence of this, it is likewise necessary that
every producing principle should generate a number of the same
order with itself, viz. nature, a natural number ; soul, one that
is psychical (i. e. belonging to soul) ; and intellect an
intellectual number. For if whatever possesses a power of
generating, generates similars prior to dissimilars, every cause
must deliver its own form and characteristic peculiarity to its
progeny ; and before it generates that which gives subsistence to
progressions, far distant and separate from its nature, it must
constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and
conjoined with it through similitude. It is, therefore, necessary
from these premises, since there is one unity, the principle of
the universe, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to
every thing else, a multitude of natures characterized (xii) by
unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause;
and these natures are no other than the Gods.
According to this theology, therefore, from the
immense principle of principles, in which all things causally
subsist, absorbed in superessential light, and involved in
unfathomable depths, a beauteous progeny of principles proceed,
all largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the
occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fulness
of good. From these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms,
these divine propagations, being, life, intellect, soul, nature,
and body depend ; monads suspended from unities, deified natures
proceeding from deities. Each of these monads, too, is the leader
of a series which extends from itself to the last of things, and
which, while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and
returns to, its leader. And all these principles, and all their
progeny, are finally centred and rooted by their summits in the
first great all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from,
and are comprehended in, the first (xiii) being : all intellects
emanate from one first intellect ; all souls from one first soul ;
all natures blossom from one first nature ; and all bodies proceed
from the vital and luminous body of the world. And, lastly, all
these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which
both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light.
Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of
monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one and all
things, and yet one prior to all.
No objections of any weight, no arguments but such
as are sophistical, can be urged against this most sublime theory,
which is so congenial to the unperverted conceptions of the human
mind, that it can only be treated with ridicule and contempt in
degraded, barren, and barbarous ages. Ignorance and impious fraud,
however, have hitherto conspired to defame those inestimable works
* in which this and many other grand and important dogmas can
(xiv) alone be found ; and the theology of the ancients has been
attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical zeal, and all
the imbecile flashes of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on
the subject, like those of a man between sleeping and waking, have
been turbid and wild, phantastic and confused, preposterous and
vain.
Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible
cause of all, a divine multitude subsists, cooperating with this
cause in the production and government of the universe, has always
been, and is still, admitted by all nations and all religions,
however much they may differ in their opinions respecting the
nature of the subordinate deities, and the veneration which is to
be paid to them by man ; and however barbarous the conceptions of
some nations on this subject may be, when compared with those of
others. Hence, says the elegant Maximus Tyrius, "You will see one
according law and assertion in all the earth, that there is one
God, the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of
God, ruling together with him. This the Greek says, and (xv) the
Barbarian says, the inhabitant of the continent, and he who dwells
near the sea, the wise and the unwise. And if you proceed as far
as to the utmost shores of the ocean, there also there are Gods,
rising very near to some, and setting very near to others." *
The deification, however, of dead men, and the
worshiping men as Gods, formed no part of this theology, when it
is considered according to its genuine purity. Numerous instances
of the truth of this might be adduced, but I shall mention for
this purpose, as unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato,
the Golden Pythagoric Verses, † and the
Treatise of Plutarch (xvi) on Isis and Osiris. All the works of
Plato, indeed, evince the truth of this position, (xvii) but this
is particularly manifest from his Laws. The Golden verses order
that the immortal Gods be honoured first, as they are disposed by
law; afterwards the illustrious Heroes, under which appellation
the author of the verses comprehends also angels and daemons,
properly so called ; and in the last place, the terrestrial
daemons, i. e. such good men as transcend in virtue the rest of
mankind. But to honour the Gods as they are disposed by law, is,
as Hierocles observes, to reverence them as they are arranged by
their demiurgus and father ; and this is to honour them as beings
not only superior to man, but also to daemons and angels. Hence,
to honour men, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to
honour the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by
their Creator ; for it is confounding the divine with the human
nature, and is thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagoric
(xviii) precept. Plutarch too, in his above mentioned treatise,
most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety of worshiping men as
Gods.*
"So great an apprehension indeed," says Dr. Stillingfleet, † "had the Heathens of
the necessity of appropriate acts of divine worship, that some of
them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what they did
not believe to be God. We have a remarkable story to this purpose
in Arrian and Curtius‡ concerning Callisthenes. Alexander arriving
at that degree of vanity as to desire to have divine worship given
him, and the matter being started out of design among the
courtiers, either by Anaxarchus, as Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian,
as Curtius says ; and the way of doing it proposed, viz. by
incense and prostration ; Callisthenes vehemently opposed it, as
that which would confound the difference of human and (xix) divine
worship, which had been preserved inviolable among them. The
worship of the Gods had been kept up in temples, with altars, and
images, and sacrifices, and hymns, and prostrations, and such like
; but it is by no means fitting, says he, for us to confound these
things, either by lifting up men to the honours of the Gods, or
depressing the Gods to the honours of men. For if Alexander would
not suffer any man to usurp his royal dignity by the votes of men
; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to take
their honours to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,* that the
Greeks thought it a mean and base thing for any of them, when sent
on any embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves
before them, because this was only allowed among them in divine
adoration. Therefore, says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were
sent to Artaxerxes, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but Ismenias
let fall his ring to the ground, and stooping for that, was
thought to make his adoration ; which (xx) was altogether as good
a shift as the Jesuits advising the crucifix to be held in the
mandarin's hands while they made their adorations in the Heathen
temples in China.
Conon* also refused to make his adoration, as a
disgrace to his city ; and Isocrates †
accuses the Persians for doing it, because herein they showed that
they despised the Gods rather than men, by prostituting their
honours to their princes. Herodotus mentions Sperchies and Bulis,
who could not with the greatest violence be brought to give
adoration to Xerxes, because it was against the law of their
country to give divine honour to men.‡
And Valerius Maximus § says, "the Athenians put Timagoras to
death for doing it ; so strong an apprehension had possessed them,
that the manner of worship which they used to their Gods, should
be preserved sacred and inviolable." The philosopher Sallust also,
in his Treatise on the Gods and the World, says, "It is not
unreasonable to suppose that impiety is a species of punishment,
and that those who have had a knowledge
(xxi) of the Gods, and yet despised them, will
in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And it is requisite
to make the punishment of those who have honoured their kings as
Gods to consist in being expelled from the Gods."*
When the ineffable transcendency of the first God,
which was considered as the grand principle in the Heathen
religion by the best theologists of all nations, and particularly
by its most illustrious promulgators, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and
Plato, was forgotten, this oblivion was doubtless the principal
cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans. Had they properly
directed their attention to this transcendency they would have
perceived it to be so immense as to surpass eternity, infinity,
selfsubsistence, and even essence itself, and that these in
reality belong to those venerable natures which are, as it were,
first unfolded into light from the unfathomable (xxii) depths of
that truly mystic unknown, about which all knowledge is refunded
into ignorance. For, as Simplicius justly observes, "It is
requisite that he who ascends to the principle of things should
investigate whether it is possible there can be any thing better
than the supposed principle ; and if something more excellent is
found, the same inquiry should again be made respecting that, till
we arrive at the highest conceptions, than which we have no longer
any more venerable. Nor should we stop in our ascent till we find
this to be the case. For there is no occasion to fear that our
progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving
something about the first principles which is greater and more
transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our
conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less
to pass beyond, the dignity of the first principles of things." He
adds, "This, therefore, is one and the best extension [of the
soul] to [the highest] God, and is, as much as possible,
irreprehensible ; viz. to know firmly, that by ascribing to him
the (xxiii) most venerable excellences we can conceive, and the
most holy and primary names and things, we ascribe nothing to him
which is suitable to his dignity. It is sufficient, however, to
procure our pardon [for the attempt], that we can attribute to him
nothing superior." * If it is not possible, therefore, to form any
ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the
ineffable, i. e. of the first principles of things, how much less
can our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the
reverential language of the Egyptians, †
(xxiv) which is even beyond these ? Had the Heathens, therefore,
considered as they ought this transcendency of the supreme God,
they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the
divine nature, and consequently would never have worshiped men as
Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause
of this impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its
dogmas, and the confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily
attended.
But to return to the present work. To some who are
conversant with the writings of Porphyry, who know how high he
ranks among the best of the Platonists, and that he was
denominated by them, on account of his excellence, the
philosopher, it may seem strange that he should have been so
unskilled in theological mysteries, and so ignorant of the
characteristics of the beings superior to man, as by his epistle
to Anebo he may appear to have been. That he was not, however, in
reality thus unskilful and (xxv) ignorant, is evident from his
admirable Treatise on Abstinence from Animal Food, and his
Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, Or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles. His apparent
ignorance, therefore, must have been assumed for the purpose of
obtaining a more perfect and copious solution of the doubts
proposed in his Epistle, than he would otherwise have received.
But at the same time that this is admitted, it must also be
observed, that he was inferior to Iamblichus in theological
science, who so greatly excelled in knowledge of this kind, that
he was not surpassed by any one, and was equaled by few. Hence he
was denominated by all succeeding Platonists the divine, in the
same manner as Plato, "to whom," as the acute Emperor Julian
remarks, "he was posterior in time only, but not in genius." *
The difficulties attending the translation of this
work into English are necessarily great, not only from its
sublimity and novelty, (xxvi) but also
from the defects of the original. I have, however, endeavoured to
make the translation as faithful and complete as possible ; and
have occasionally availed myself of the annotations of Gale, not
being able to do so continually, because for the most part, where
philosophy is concerned, he shows himself to be an inaccurate,
impertinent, and garrulous smatterer.
* (pg. ix) According to this theology, as I have elsewhere
shown, in every order of things, a triad is the immediate progeny
of a monad. Hence the intelligible triad proceeds immediately from
the ineffable principle of things. Phanes, or intelligible
intellect, who is the last of the intelligible order, is the
monad, leader, and producing cause of a triad, which is
denominated νοητος και νοεροσ, i, e. intelligible, and at the
same time intellectual. In like manner the extremity of this order
produces immediately from itself the intellectual triad, Saturn,
Rhea, and Jupiter. Again, Jupiter, who is also the Demiurgus, is
the monad of the supermundane triad. Apollo, who subsists at the
extremity of the supermundane order, produces a triad of liberated
Gods. (θεοι απολυτοι.) And the extremity of the liberated order
becomes the monad of a triad of mundane Gods. This theory, too,
which is the progeny of the most consummate science, is in perfect
conformity with the Chaldean theology. And hence it is said in one
of the Chaldean oracles, "In every world a triad shines forth, of
which a monad is the ruling principle." (Παντα
γαρ εν κοσμῳ λαμπει τριας ης μονας αρχει). I refer the reader, who is
desirous of being fully convinced of all this, to my translation
of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
* (pg. xiii) Viz. The Philosophical Works of Proclus, together
with those of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius,
Damascius, Olympiodorus, and Simplicius.
* (pg. xv) Ενα οδοισαν εν πασα
γῃ ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων βασιλευς και
πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεοῳ. ταυτα και ο
ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο θαλαττοις,
και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος. κᾳν επι του ωκεανου ελθῃς τας ηϊονας,
κᾳκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε καταδυομενοι. Dissert, i.
Edit. Princ.
† (pg. xv) "Diogenes Laertius says of
Pythagoras, that he charged his disciples not to give equal
degrees of honour to the Gods and heroes. Herodotus (in Euterpe)
says of the Greeks, That they worshiped Hercules two ways, one as
an immortal deify, and so they sacrificed to him ; and another as
a Hero, and so they celebrated his memory. Isocrates (Encom.
Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods, when
he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction is no where
more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon the statue
of Regilla, wife to Herodes Atticus, as Salmasius thinks, which
was set up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from the statue
itself by Sirmondus ; where it is said, That she had neither the
honour of a mortal nor yet that which was proper to the Gods.
Ουδε ιερα θνητοις, αταρ ουδε
θεοισιν ομοια. It seems by the inscription
of Herodes, and by the testament of Epicteta, extant in Greek in
the Collection of Inscriptions, that it was in the power of
particular families to keep festival days in honour of some of
their own family, and to give heroical honours to them. In that
noble inscription at Venice, we find three (lays appointed every
year to be kept, and a confraternity established for that purpose
with the laws of it. The first day to be observed in honour of the
Muses, and sacrifices to be offered to them as deities. The second
and third days in honour of the heroes of the family ; between
which honour and that of deities, they showed the difference by
the distance of time between them, and the preference given to the
other. But whereinsoever the difference lay, that there was a
distinction acknowledged among them appears by this passage of Valerius, in his excellent oration, extant in Dionvsius
Halicarnass. Antiq. Rom. lib. ii. p. 696. I call, says he,
the
Gods to witness, whose temples and altars our family has worshiped
with common sacrifices; and neat after them, I call the Genii of
our ancestors, to whom we give
δευτερας τιμασ, the second honours
next to the Gods, (as Celsus calls those,
τας προσηκουσας τιμασ, the due honours that belong to the lower daemons.) From
which we take notice, that the Heathens did not confound all
degrees of divine worship, giving to the lowest object the same
which they supposed to be due to the celestial deities, or the
supreme God. So that if the distinction of divine worship will
excuse from idolatry, the Heathens were not to blame for it." See Stillingfleet's Answer to a book entitled Catholics no Idolaters,
p. 510, 513, &c.
* (pg. xviii) See the extracts from Plutarch, in
which this is shown, in the Introduction to my translation of
Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
† (pg. xviii)
Answer to Catholics no Idolaters. Lond. 1676. p. 211
‡ (pg. xviii)
Arrian, de
Exped. Alex. 1. iv. et Curt, lib. viii.
* (pg. xix) Vit. Artaxerx. Aelian. Var. Hist. lib. i.
c. 21,
* (pg. xx) Justin. lib. vi.
†
(pg. xx)
Panegyr.
‡
(pg. xx)
Lib. vii.
§ (pg. xx) Lib. vi. cap. iii.
* (pg. xxi)
Και κολασεως δε ειδος ειναι αθειαν ουκ
απεικος. τους γαρ γνοντας θεους, και καταφρονησαντας, ευλογον εν ετερῳ
βιῳ και της γνωσεως σερεσθαι, και τους εαυτων βασιλεας ως θεους
τιμησαντας, εδει την δικην αυτων τοιησαι των θεων εκπεσειν. Cap. xviii.
* (pg. xxiii) Και χρη τον επι
τας αρχας αναβαινοντα ζητειν, ει δυναμτον ειναι τι κρειττον της
υποτεθεισης αρζηε κᾳν ευρεθῃ, παλιν επ' εκεινου ζητειν, εως αν εις
τας ακροτατας εννοισα ελθωμεν, ων ουκετι σεμνοτερας εχομεν˙
και μη σησαι την αναβασιν.
ουδε γαρ ευλαβητεον μη κενεμβατωμεν, μειζονα τινα και ψπερβαινοντα
τας πρωτας αρχας περι αυτων εννοοντες. ου γαρ δυνατον τηλικουτον
πηδημα πηδησαι τας ημετερας εννοισα, ως παρισωθηναι τῃ αξιᾳ των
πρωτων αρχων, ου λεγω και υπερπτηναι. μια γαρ αυτη προς θεον
ανατασις αροση, και ως δυνατον απταισος. και ων εννοομεν αγαθων τα
σεμνοτατα, και αγιωτατα, και προτουργα, και ονοματα και πραγματα
αυτῳ ανατιθεντας ειδεναι βεβαιως, οτι μεδεν ανατεθεικαμεν αξιον.
αρκει δε ημιν εις συγγνωμην, το μεδεν εχειν υπερτερον. Simplic. in Epict. Enchir. p. 207. Lond. 1670. 8vo.
† (pg. xxiii) Of the first
principles, says Damascius in MS.
περι αρχων, the Egyptians
said nothing, but celebrated it as a darkness beyond all
intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness.
Πρωτην αρχην ανυμνηκασιν, σκοτος
υπερ πασαν νοησιν, σκοτος αγνωσον τρις τουτοο επιφημιζοντες.
* (pg. xxv) For farther particulars respecting this
most extraordinary man, see the introduction to my translation of
his Life of Pythagoras, and my History of the Restoration of the
Platonic Theology.
THE
EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY
TO THE
EGYPTIAN ANEBO.
Porphyry to the Prophet Anebo greeting.
I COMMENCE my friendship towards you from
the Gods and good daemons, and from those philosophic
disquisitions, which have an affinity to these powers. And
concerning these particulars indeed, much has been said by the
Grecian philosophers ; but, for the most part, the principles of
their belief are derived from conjecture.
In the first place, therefore, it is
granted that there are Gods. But I inquire what the
peculiarities are of each of the more excellent genera, by which
they are separated from each other; and whether we must say that
the cause of the distinction between them is from their
energies, or their passive motions, or from things
(1) that are consequent, or from
their different arrangement with respect to bodies ; as, for
instance, from the arrangement of the Gods with reference to
etherial, but of demons to aerial, and of souls to terrestrial,
bodies?
I also ask, why, since [all] the Gods dwell
in the heavens, theurgists only invoke the terrestrial and
subterranean Gods ? Likewise, how some of the Gods are said to
be aquatic and aerial? And how different Gods are allotted
different places, and the parts of bodies according to
circumscription, though they have an infinite, impartible, and
incomprehensible power? How there will be a union of them with
each other, if they are separated by the divisible
circumscriptions of parts, and by the difference of places and
subject bodies?
How do theologists, or those who are wise
in divine concerns, represent the Gods as passive, to whom on
this account, it is said, erect phalli are exhibited, and
obscene language is used? But if they are impassive, the
invocations of the Gods will be in vain, which announce that
they can appease the anger of the divinities, and procure a
reconciliation with them ; and still more, what are called the
necessities of the Gods, will be in vain. For that which is
impassive cannot be allured, nor compelled, nor necessitated.
How, therefore, are many (3) things, in sacred operations,
performed to them as passive? Invocations, likewise, are made to
the Gods as passive; so that not demons only are passive, but
the Gods also, conformably to what Homer says,
" And flexible are
e'en the Gods themselves."*
But if we assert with certain persons, that
the Gods are pure intellects, but that daemons, being psychical,
participate of intellect ; in a still greater degree will pure
intellects be incapable of being allured, and will be unmingled
with sensible natures. Supplications, however, are foreign to
the purity of intellect, and therefore are not to be made to it.
But the throbs which are offered [in sacred rites] are offered
as to sensitive and psychical essences.
Are, therefore, the Gods separated from
daemons, through the former being incorporeal, but the latter
corporeal? If, however, the Gods are incorporeal alone, how will
the sun and moon, and the visible celestials, be Gods?
How, likewise, are some of the Gods
beneficent, but others malefic ?
What is it that connects the Gods in the
heavens that have bodies, with the incorporeal Gods ?
(4) What is it that distinguishes
demons from the visible and invisible Gods, since the visible
are connected with the invisible Gods?
In what do a daemon, hero, and soul, differ
from each other ? Is it in essence, or in power, or in energy?
What is the indication of a God, or angel,
or archangel, or demon, or a certain archon, or soul being
present? For to speak boastingly, and to exhibit a phantasm of a
certain quality, is common to Gods and daemons, and to all the
more excellent genera. So that the genus of Gods will in no
respect be better than that of daemons.
Since the ignorance of, and deception
about, divine natures is impiety and impurity, but a scientific
knowledge of the Gods is holy and beneficial, the ignorance of
things honourable and beautiful will be darkness, but the
knowledge of them will be light. And the former, indeed, will
fill men with all evils, through the want of erudition, and
through audacity ; but the latter will be the cause to them of
every good. [I wish you, therefore, to unfold to me the
truth respecting these particulars.*]
[And, in the first place, I wish you to
explain (5) to me distinctly*] what that is which is effected in
divination? For we frequently obtain knowledge of future events
through dreams, when we are asleep ; not being, at that time, in
a tumultuous ecstasy, for the body is then quiescent; but we do
not apprehend what then takes place, in the same manner as when
we are awake.
But many, through enthusiasm and divine
inspiration, predict future events, and are then in so wakeful a
state, as even to energize according to sense, and yet they are
not conscious of the state they are in, or at least, not so much
as they were before.
Some also of those who suffer a mental
alienation, energize enthusiastically on hearing cymbals or
drums, or a certain modulated sound, such as those who are
Corybantically inspired, those who are possessed by Sabazius,
and those who are inspired by the mother of the Gods. But some
energize enthusiastically by drinking water, as the priest of
Clarius, in Colophon ; others, by being seated at the mouth of a
cavern, as those who prophesy at Delphi; and others by imbibing
the vapour from water, as the prophetesses in Branchidae. Some
also become enthusiastic by standing on (6) characters, as those
that are filled from the intromission of spirits. Others, who
are conscious what they are doing in other respects, are
divinely inspired according to the phantastic part; some,
indeed, receiving darkness for a cooperator, others certain
potions, but others incantations and compositions : and some
energize, according to the imagination, through water ; others
in a wall, others in the open air, and others in the sun, or in
some other of the celestial bodies. Some also establish the art
of the investigation of futurity through the viscera, through
birds, and through the stars.
I likewise ask concerning the mode of
divination, what it is, and what the quality by which it is
distinguished ? All diviners, indeed, assert, that they obtain a
foreknowledge of future events through Gods or daemons, and that
it is not possible for any others to know that which is future,
than those who are the lords of futurity. I doubt, therefore,
whether divinity is so far subservient to men, as not to be
averse to some becoming diviners from meal.
But, concerning the causes of divination,
it is dubious whether a God, an angel, or a daemon, or sonic
other power, is present in manifestations, or divinations, or
certain other sacred (7) energies, as is the case with those
powers that are drawn down through you [priests] by the
necessities with which invocation is attended.
Or does the soul assert and imagine these
things, and are they, as some think, the passions of the soul,
excited from small incentives?
Or is a certain mixed form of subsistence
produced from our soul, and divine inspiration externally
derived?
Hence it must be said, that the soul
generates the power which has an imaginative perception of
futurity, through motions of this kind, or that the things which
are adduced from matter constitute daemons, through the powers
that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from
the matter which is taken from animals.
For in sleep, when we are not employed
about any thing, we sometimes obtain a knowledge of the future.
But that a passion of the soul is the cause
of divination, is indicated by this, that the senses are
occupied, that fumigations are introduced, and that invocations
are employed ; and likewise, that not all men, but those that
are more simple and young, are more adapted to prediction.
The ecstasy, also, of the reasoning power
is (8) the cause of divination, as is likewise the mania which
happens in diseases, or mental aberration, or a sober and
vigilant condition, or suffusions of the body, or the
imaginations excited by diseases, or an ambiguous state of mind,
such as that which takes place between a sober condition and
ecstasy, or the imaginations artificially procured by
enchantment.
Nature, likewise, art, and the sympathy of
things in the universe, as if they were the parts of one animal,
contain premanifestations of certain things with reference to
each other. And bodies are so prepared, that there is a
presignification of some by others, which is clearly indicated
by the works performed in predicting what is future. For those
who invoke the divinities for this purpose, have about them
stones and herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also
dissolve, open places that are shut, and change the deliberate
intentions of the recipients, so as from being depraved to
render them worthy, though they were before depraved. Nor are
the artificers of efficacious images to be despised. For they
observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from
the concurrence of what star with a certain star or stars,
predictions will be true or false ; and also whether the things
that are performed will be inanities, or significant (9) and
efficacious, though no divinity or daemon is drawn down by these
images.
But there are some who suppose that there
is a certain obedient genus of daemons, which is naturally
fraudulent, omniform, and various, and which assumes the
appearance of Gods and daemons, and the souls of the deceased ;
and that through these every thing which appears to be either
good or evil is effected ; for they are not able to contribute
any thing to true goods, such as those of the soul, nor to have
any knowledge of them, but they abuse, deride, and frequently
impede those who are striving to be virtuous. They are likewise
full of pride, and rejoice in vapours and sacrifices.
Jugglers likewise fraudulently attack us in
many ways, through the ardour of the expectations which they
raise.
It very much indeed perplexes me to
understand how superior beings, when invoked, are commanded by
those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors ; and
they think it requisite that he who worships them should be
just, but when they are called upon to act unjustly, they do not
refuse so to act. Though the Gods, likewise, do not hear him who
invokes them, if he is impure from venereal connexions, yet, at
the same time, they do not refuse to lead any one to illegal
venery.
(10) [I am likewise dubious with respect to
sacrifices, what utility or power they possess in the universe,
and with the Gods, and on what account they are performed,
appropriately indeed, to the powers who are honoured by them,
but usefully to those by whom the gifts are offered.*]
Why also do the interpreters of prophecies
and oracles think it requisite that they should abstain from
animals, lest the Gods should be polluted by the vapours arising
from them ; and yet the Gods are especially allured by the
vapours of animals?
Why is it requisite that the inspector [who
presides over sacred rites] ought not to touch a dead body,
though most sacred operations are performed through dead bodies?
And why, which is much more absurd than this, are threats
employed and false terrors, by any casual person, not to a
daemon, or some departed soul, but to the sovereign Sun himself,
or to the Moon, or some one of the celestial Gods, in order to
compel these divinities to speak the truth? For does not he who
says that he will burst the heavens, or unfold the
(11)secrets of Isis, or point out the
arcanum in the adytum, or stop Baris, or scatter the members of
Osiris to Typhon, [or that he will do something else of the like
kind *], does not he who says this, by thus threatening what he
neither knows nor is able to effect, prove himself to be stupid
in the extreme? And what abjectness does it not produce in those
who, like very silly children, are possessed with such vain
fear, and are terrified at such fictions ? And yet Chaeremon,
who was a sacred scribe, writes these things, as disseminated by
the Egyptians. It is also said, that these, and things of the
like kind, are of a most compulsive nature.
What also is the meaning of those mystic
narrations which say that a certain divinity is unfolded into
light from mire, that he is seated above the lotus, that he
sails in a ship, and that he changes his forms every hour,
according to the signs of the zodiac ? For thus, they say, he
presents himself to the view, and thus ignorantly adapt the
peculiar passion of their own imagination to the God himself.
But if these things are asserted symbolically, being symbols of
the powers of this divinity, I request an interpretation of
these symbols. For (12) it is evident, that if these are similar
to passions of the Sun, when he is eclipsed, they would be seen
by all men who intently survey the God.
What also is the design of names that are
without signification? and why, of such, are those that are
barbaric preferred to our own? For if he who hears them looks to
their signification, it is sufficient that the conception
remains the same, whatever the words may be that are used. For
he who is invoked is not of the Egyptian race ; nor, if he was
an Egyptian, does he use the Egyptian, or, in short, any human
language. For either all these are the artificial contrivances
of enchanters, and veils originating from our passions, which
rumour ascribes to a divine nature ; or we ignorantly frame
conceptions of divinity, contrary to its real mode of
subsistence.
I likewise wish you to unfold to me, what
the Egyptians conceive the first cause to be ; whether
intellect, or above intellect? whether alone, or subsisting with
some other or others ? whether incorporeal, or corporeal ; and
whether it is the same with the Demiurgus, or prior to the
Demiurgus ? Likewise, whether all things are from one principle,
or from many principles? whether the Egyptians have a knowledge
of matter, or of primary corporeal qualities ; and whether they
admit matter to be (13) unbegotten, or to be generated? For
Chaeremon, indeed, and others, do not think there is any thing
else prior to the visible worlds ; but in the beginning of their
writings on this subject, admit the existence of the Gods of the
Egyptians, but of no others, except what are called the planets,
the Gods that give completion to the zodiac, and such as rise
together with these ; and likewise, the sections into decans,
and the horoscopes. They also admit the existence of what are
called the powerful leaders, whose names are to be found in the
calendars, together with their ministrant offices, their risings
and settings, and their significations of future events. For
Chaeremon saw that what those who say that the sun is the
Demiurgus, and likewise what is asserted concerning Osiris and
Isis, and all the sacred fables, may be resolved into the stars
and the phases, occultations and risings of these, or into the
increments or decrements of the moon, or into the course of the
sun, or the nocturnal and diurnal hemisphere, or into the river
[Nile]. And, in short, the Egyptians resolve all things into
physical, and nothing into incorporeal and living essences. Most
of them likewise suspend that which is in our power from the
motion of the stars ; and bind all things, though I know not
how, with the indissoluble bonds
(14)
of necessity, which they call fate. They also connect fate with
the Gods ; whom, nevertheless, they worship in temples and
statues, and other things, as the only dissolvers of fate.
Concerning the peculiar daemon, it must be
inquired how he is imparted by the lord of the geniture, and
according to what kind of efflux, or life, or power, he descends
from him to us? And also, whether he exists, or does not exist?
And whether the invention of the lord of the geniture is
impossible, or possible? For if it is possible he is happy, who
having learned the scheme of his nativity, and knowing his
proper daemon, becomes liberated from fate.
The canons, also, of genethliology [or
prediction from the natal day] are innumerable and
incomprehensible. And the knowledge of this mathematical science
cannot be obtained ; for there is much dissonance concerning it,
and Choeremon and many others have written against it. But the
discovery of the lord, or lords, of the geniture, if there are
more than one in a nativity, is nearly granted by astrologers
themselves to be unattainable, and yet they say that on this the
knowledge of the proper daemon depends.
Farther still, I wish to know whether the
peculiar daemon rules over some one of the parts in us? For it
appears to certain persons, (15) that daemons preside over the
parts of our body, so that one is the guardian of health,
another of the form of the body, and another of the corporeal
habits, and that there is one daemon who presides in common over
all these. And again, that one daemon presides over the body,
another over the soul, and another over the intellect; and that
some of them are good, but others bad.
I am also dubious whether this daemon is
not a certain part of the soul, [such, for instance, as the
intellectual part;] and if so, lie will be happy who has wise
intellect.
I see likewise, that there is a twofold
worship of the peculiar daemon ; the one being the worship as of
two, but the other as of three. By all men, however, the daemon
is called upon by a common invocation.
I farther ask, whether there is a certain other latent way to
felicity, separate from the Gods? And I am dubious whether it is
requisite to look to human opinions in divine divination and
theurgy? And whether the soul does not devise great things from
casual circumstances? Moreover, there are certain other methods
which are conversant with the prediction of future events. And,
perhaps, those who possess divine divination, foresee indeed
what will happen, yet are not on this account (16) happy ; for
they foresee future events, but do not
know how to use this knowledge properly. I wish, therefore, that
you would point out to me the path to felicity, and show me in
what the essence of it consists. For with us [Greeks] there is
much verbal contention about it, because we form a conjecture of
good from human reasonings. But by those who have devised the
means of associating with beings more excellent than man, if
the investigation of this subject is omitted, wisdom will be
professed by them in vain ; as they will only disturb a divine
intellect about the discovery of a fugitive slave, or the
purchase of land, or, if it should so happen, about marriage, or
merchandize. And if they do not omit this subject, but assert
what is most true about other things, yet say nothing that is
stable and worthy of belief about felicity, in consequence of
employing themselves about things that are difficult, but
useless to mankind ; in this case, they will not be conversant
either with Gods or good daemons, but with that daemon who is
called fraudulent ; or, if this is not admitted, the whole will
be the invention of men, and the fiction of a mortal nature.
* (pg. 3) Iliad, lib. x. v.
* (pg. 4) Gale has omitted to give the original
of the sentence contained in the brackets ; the translation of which I
have added from the answer of Iamblichus to this epistle.
* (pg. 5) Here also the original is omitted by
Gale, and the translation of it is given by me from the text of
Iamblichus.
* (pg. 10)The
paragraph within the brackets is omitted in the original ; but I
have supplied it from the following answer of Iamblichus to this
Epistle. This omission is not noticed by Gale.
* (pg. 11) Here
likewise the words within the brackets, which are omitted in the
original, are added from Iamblichus ; but the omission is not noticed
by Gale.
(xxvii)
Iamblichus* on the Mysteries, &c
___
THE
ANSWER OF THE PRECEPTOR ABAMMON
TO THE
EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY TO ANEBO,
AND A
SOLUTION OF THE DOUBTS CONTAINED IN IT.
___
SECTION I.
___
CHAP. I.
HERMES, the God who presides over language, was formerly very
properly considered as common to all priests ; and the power who
presides over the true science concerning the Gods (18) is one and
the same in the whole of things. Hence our ancestors dedicated the
inventions of their wisdom to this deity, inscribing all their own
writings with the name of Hermes. If, therefore, we participate of
a portion of this God, adapted and commensurate to our powers, you
do well to propose your theological doubts to the priests, as
friends, and to make these doubts known to them. I also very
properly conceiving that the epistle sent to my disciple Anebo was
written to me, shall give you a true answer to your inquiries. For
it would not be becoming, that Pythagoras and Plato, Democritus
and Eudoxus, and many other of (19) the ancient Greeks, should
have obtained appropriate instruction from the sacred scribes of
their time, but that you who are our contemporary, and think
conformably to those ancients, should be frustrated of your wish
by those who are now living, and who are called common preceptors.
I, therefore, thus betake myself to the present discussion; and do
you, if you please, conceive that the same person to whom you sent
the letter returns you an answer. Of, if it should seem fit to
you, admit it to be me who discourses with you in writing, or some
other prophet of the Egyptians, for this is of no consequence. Or,
which I think is still better, dismiss the consideration whether
the speaker is an inferior or a superior character, but direct
your attention to what is said, so as readily to excite your mind
to survey whether what is asserted is true or false.
In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of
the proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and
quality of them. And, in the -next place, we shall show from what
theologies the doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences
they are investigated. For some things that are badly confused,
require a certain distinction ; others are conversant with the
cause through which (20) they subsist, and are apprehended ;
others, which we propose according to a certain contrariety, draw
our decision on both sides ; and some things require from us the
whole development of mystic doctrines. Such, therefore, being the
nature of the subjects of discussion, they are assumed from many
places, and from different sciences. For some things introduce
animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have
delivered ; others produce objections from what the prophets of
the Egyptians teach ; and there are some that, adhering to the
theory of philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There
are now likewise some, that from other opinions, which do not
deserve to be mentioned, elicite a certain dubitation ; and others
originate from the common conceptions of mankind. These things,
therefore, are of themselves variously disposed, and are
multiformly connected with each other. Hence, through all these
causes, a certain discussion is requisite for the management of
them in a becoming manner.
*
(pg. 16) The following testimony of an anonymous Greek writer,
prefixed to the manuscript of this treatise, which Gale published,
proves that this work was written by Iamblichus:
Ιστεον οτι ο φιλοσοφος Προκλος
υπομνηματιζων τας του μεγολου Πλωτινου εννεαδας, λεγυει οτι ο
αντιγραφων εις την προκειμενην του Πορφυριου επισολην, α θεσπεσιος
εσιν Ιαμβλιχος˙
και δια το της υποθεσεως οικειον και ακαλουον, υποκρινεται
προσωπον Αιγψπτιου τινος Αβαμωνος˙
αλλα και το της λεξεως κομματικον και αφορισικον, και το των
εννοιων πραγματικον, και γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, μαρτψρει τον
Προκλον καλως και κριναντα, και ισορησαντα. i. e. "It is
requisite to know that the philosopher Proclus, in his Commentary
on the Enneads of the great Plotinus, says that it is the divine
Iamblichus who answers the prefixed Epistle of Porphyry, and who
assumes the person of a certain Egyptian of the name of Abammon,
through the affinity and congruity of the hypothesis. And, indeed,
the conciseness and definiteness of the diction, and the
efficacious, elegant, and divine nature of the conceptions,
testify that the decision of Proclus is just." That this, indeed,
was the opinion of Proclus, is evident from a passage in his
Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato, which has escaped the notice
of Gale, and which the reader will find in a note on the fourth
chapter of the eighth section of the following translation.
(21)
CHAP. II.
WE shall, therefore, deliver to you the peculiar
dogmas of the Assyrians ; and also clearly develop to you our own
opinions; collecting some things from the infinite writings of the
ancients, but others from those particulars which were
comprehended by the ancients in one treatise, and pertain to the
whole knowledge of divine natures. If also you should propose any
philosophic inquiry, we shall discuss it for you, according to the
ancient pillars of Hermes, which Plato and Pythagoras knew before,
and from thence constituted their philosophy. But such things as
exhibit foreign inquiries, or which are contradictory and
contentious, we shall assist mildly and aptly, or we shall
demonstrate their absurdity. Such, likewise, as proceed
conformably* to common conceptions, we shall endeavour to discuss
in a way perfectly known and clear. And things, indeed, which
require the experience of divine operations to an accurate
knowledge of them, we shall explain, as far as this is possible to
be effected by words alone; but such as are (22) full of
intellectual theory, we shall develop with a view to the
purification of the soul. But indications of this theory worthy of
notice may be mentioned, by which it is possible for you, and
those who resemble you, to be conducted by intellect to the
essence of [real] beings. And with respect to such things as
become known by a reasoning process, we shall leave no one of
these without a perfect demonstration. But in all things we shall
give to each that which is appropriate. And such questions,
indeed, as are theological, we shall answer theologically ; such
as are theurgic, theurgically ; but such as are philosophical, we
shall, in conjunction with you, philosophically explore. Of these,
also, such as extend to first causes, we shall unfold into light,
by following them conformably to first principles. But such as
pertain to morals, or to ends, we shall fitly discuss, according
to the ethical mode. And, in a similar manner, we shall examine
other things methodically and appropriately. Let us, therefore,
now betake ourselves to your inquiries.
* (pg. 21) In the original
κατα τας κοινας εννοισασ,
which Gales erroneously translates contra communes opiniones.
(23)
CHAP. III.
IΝ the first place, therefore, you say, "it
must be granted that there are Gods." Thus to speak, however,
is not right on this subject. For an innate knowledge of the Gods
is coexistent with our very essence ; and this knowledge is
superior to all judgment and deliberate choice, and subsists prior
to reason and demonstration. It is also counited from the
beginning with its proper cause, and is consubsistent with the
essential tendency of the soul to the good. If, indeed, it
be requisite to speak the truth, the contact with divinity is not
knowledge. For knowledge is in a certain respect separated [from
its object] by otherness.* But prior to the knowledge,
which as one thing knows another, is the uniform connexion with
divinity, and which is suspended from the Gods, is spontaneous and
inseparable from them. Hence, it is not proper to grant this, as
(24) if it might not be granted, nor to admit it as ambiguous (for
it is always unically established in energy) ; nor are we worthy
thus to explore it, as if we had sufficient authority to approve
or reject it. For we are comprehended in it, or rather we are
filled by it, and we possess that very thin; which we are, [or by
which our essence is characterized] in knowing the Gods.
I shall likewise say the same thing to you,
concerning the more excellent genera that follow the Gods, I mean
daemons, heroes, and undefiled souls.* For it is necessary to
understand respecting these, that there is always in them one
definite reason of essence, and to remove from them the
indefiniteness and instability of the human condition. It is
likewise requisite to separate from them that inclination (25) to
one side of an argument rather than another, arising from the
equilibrium of a reasoning process. For a thing of this kind is
foreign from the principles of reason and life, and rather tends
to secondary natures, and to such things as pertain to the power
and contrariety of generation. But it is necessary that the more
excellent genera should be apprehended uniformly.
The connascent perception, therefore, of the
perpetual attendance of the Gods, will be assimilated to them.
Hence, as they have an existence which is always invariably the
same, thus also the human soul is conjoined to them by knowledge,
according to a sameness of subsistence ; by no means pursuing
through conjecture, or opinion, or a syllogistic process, all
which originate in time, an essence which is above all these, but
through the pure and blameless intellections which the soul
received from eternity from the Gods, becoming united to them.
You, however, seem to think, that there is the same knowledge of
divine natures as of any thing else, and that one thing, rather
than another, may be granted from opposites, in the same manner as
it is usual to do in dialectic discussions. There is, however, no
similitude whatever between the two kinds of knowledge. For the
knowledge of divine natures is different from that of other (26)
things, and is separated from all opposition. It likewise neither
subsists in being now granted, or in becoming to be, but was from
eternity, uniformly consubsistent with the soul. And thus much I
say to you concerning the first principle in us, from which it is
necessary those should begin who speak or hear any thing about the
natures that are superior to us.
*
(pg. 23) Damascius
περι αρχων says, " that
difference not existing, there will not be knowledge."
And, "that the contact as of one with one is above knowledge."
Likewise, "that the intellectual perception of the first
intelligible is without any difference or distinction.
ετεροτητος ην ουσης, μηδε γνωσις
εσαι. Et
συναφη ως ενος προς εν, υπερ γνωσιν.
Alibi, αδιακριτος η του πρωτου
νοητου νοησις.
* Between souls that always abide
on high with purity, such as the souls of essential heroes,
and those that descend into the regions of mortality, and are
defiled with vice, such as the souls of the greater part of
mankind, the class of undefiled souls subsists. These
descend into the realms of generation, partly from that necessity
by which all human souls are, at times, drawn down to the earth,
and partly for the benevolent purpose of benefiting those of an
inferior class. But they descend without being defiled with vice.
They are also called heroes, κατα
σχεσιν, i. e. according to habitude, in order to
distinguish them from essential heroes. And, in the
Pythagoric Golden Verses, they are denominated the terrestrial
heroes.
CHAP. IV.
WITH respect to your inquiry, "what the
peculiarities are in each of the more excellent genera, by which
they are separated from each other?" if you understand by
peculiarities the specific differences under the same genus, which
are distinguished by opposite qualities, as the rational and
irrational under animal; we by no means admit peculiarities of
this kind, iii things which neither have one common essence, nor
an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from
something common, which is indefinite, and defines the
peculiarity. But if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in
prior and secondary natures, differing in their whole essence and
whole genus, a certain simple condition of being, definite in
itself; in this case, (27) your conception of peculiarities will
be reasonable. For these peculiarities of things, which have an
eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely exempt. The inquiry,
however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was necessary, in the first
place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of the more excellent
genera, according to essence ; in the next place, what they are
according to power ; and thus afterwards, what they are according
to energy. But, as your question now stands, with respect to the
peculiarities by which these genera are separated, you alone speak
of the peculiarities of energies. Hence you inquire concerning the
difference in the last things pertaining to them ; but you leave
uninvestigated such things as are first, and most honourable in
them, and which are the elements of their difference. In the same
place, also, something is added concerning "efficacious and
passive 9rzotions," which is a division by no means adapted to
the difference of the more excellent genera. For the contrariety
of action and passion is not inherent in any one of them ; but
their energies are unrestrained, immutable, and without habitude
to their opposites. Hence, neither must we admit in them motions
of such a kind as arise from action and passion. For neither do we
admit in the soul a self-motion, which consists (28) of the mover
and that which is moved; but we conceive that it is a certain
simple essential motion, subsisting from itself,* and not
possessing a habitude to another thing, and exempt from acting on,
and suffering from, itself. Who, therefore, can endure that the
peculiarities of the genera superior to the soul, should be
distinguished according to active or passive motions?
That also which is added by you, "or of
accidents," is foreign from these genera. For in composites,
and things which exist together with, or in others, or are
comprehended by others, some things are conceived to be
precedaneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but
others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain
coarrangement of them, and incongruity and interval intervenes.
But, in the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in
τῳ ειναι, i. e. in merely
existing ; and wholes have a precedaneous subsistence, are
separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in
others ; so that there is not any thing in them which is
accidental. Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized
from accidents.
At the end, likewise, of your inquiry, you (29)
introduce a distinction according to nature. For your question
asks, "How essences are known by energies, by physical motions,
and by accidents?" The very contrary, however, to all
this takes place. For if energies and motions were constitutive of
essences, they would be the lords of the difference which is
between them. But if essences generate energies, the former being
separate prior to the latter, will impart to motions, energies,
and accidents, that by which they differ from each other. This,
therefore, subsists contrarily to what you suppose, for the
purpose of discovering the peculiarity which you now investigate.
In short, whether you think that there is one
genus of the Gods, one of daemons, and in a similar manner of
heroes, and souls essentially incorporeal ; or whether you admit
that these are severally many, you inquire what the difference of
them is according to peculiarities. For if you apprehend that each
of these is one [and the same genus] the whole arrangement of
scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth requires, you
admit that they are generically distinguished, and that there is
not in them one common essential definition, but that those of
them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it
is not possible to discover their common boundaries. And even if
(30) this were possible, this very thing would destroy their
peculiarities. In this way, therefore, the object of investigation
cannot be found. He, however, he who directs his attention to the
analogous sameness which exists in superior natures, as, for
instance, in the many genera of the Gods, and again in daemons and
heroes, and, in the last place, in souls, will be able to define
their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is demonstrated by us
what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and what its
[accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is impossible,
and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.
* (pg. 28) For
αυτην εαυτοις ουσαν in this
place, it is necessary to read
αυτην εαυτης ουσαν.
CHAP. V.
IN the next place, let us direct our attention
to the solution of your inquiries. There is, therefore, the
good itself which is beyond essence, and there is that good
which subsists according to essence; I mean the essence which is
most ancient and most honourable, and by itself incorporeal. And
this is the illustrious peculiarity of the Gods, which exists in
all the genera that subsist about them, preserving (31) their
appropriate distribution and order, and not being divulsed from
it, and at the same time being inherent with invariable sameness
in all the Gods, and their perpetual attendants.
In souls, however, which rule over bodies, and
precedaneously pay attention to them, and which, prior to
generation, have by themselves a perpetual arrangement, essential
good is not present, nor the cause of good, which is prior to
essence ; but to these a certain participation* and habit,
proceeding from essential good, accedes ; just as we see that the
participation of beauty and virtue is very different [in these
souls] from that which we behold in men. For the latter is
ambiguous, and accedes to composite natures as something
adventitious. But the former has an immutable and never failing
establishment in souls, and neither itself ever departs from
itself, nor can be taken away by any thing else. Such, therefore,
being the beginning and end in the divine genera, conceive two
media between these extreme boundaries, viz. the order of heroes,
which has an arrangement more elevated than that of souls, in
power and virtue, in beauty and magnitude, and in all the goods
which subsist about souls, and which, though it entirely
transcends the (32) psychical order, yet, at the same time, is
proximately conjoined to it, through the alliance of a similar
formed life. But the other medium, which is suspended from the
Gods, though it is far inferior to them, is that of daemons, which
is not of a primarily operative nature, but is subservient to, and
follows the beneficent will of the Gods. It likewise unfolds into
energy the invisible good of the Gods, being itself assimilated to
it, and gives completion to its fabrications conformably to it.
For it renders that which is ineffable in the good of the Gods
effable, illuminates that which is formless in forms, and produces
into visible reasons [or productive forms] that which in divine
good is above all reason. Receiving also a connascent
participation of things beautiful, it imparts and transfers it, in
unenvying abundance, to the genera posterior to itself. These
middle genera, therefore, give completion to the common bond of
the Gods and souls, and cause the connexion of them to be
indissoluble. They also bind together the one continuity of things
from on high as far as to the end; make the communion of wholes to
be inseparable ; cause all things to have the best, and a
commensurate mixture ; in a certain respect, equally transmit the
progression from more excellent to inferior natures, and the
elevation from things posterior (33) to such as are prior ; insert
in more imperfect beings order and measures of the communication
-which descends from more excellent natures, and of that by which
it is received ; and make all things to be familiar and coadapted
to all, supernally receiving the causes of all these from the
Gods.
You must not, therefore, think that this
division is the peculiarity of powers or energies, or of essence;
nor assuming it separately, must you survey it in one of these.
But by extending it in common through all the genera, you will
give perfection to the answer concerning the peculiarities of
Gods, daemons, and heroes, and also of those in souls which are
now the subjects of your inquiry.
Again, however, according to another mode of
considering the subject, it is necessary to ascribe to the Gods
the whole of that which is united, of whatever kind it may be;
that which is firmly established in itself, and which is the cause
of impartible essences ; the immoveable, which also is to be
considered as the cause of all motion, and which transcends the
whole of things, and has nothing in common with them ; and the
unmingled and the separate, understood in common in essence, power
and energy, and every thing else of this kind. But that which (34)
is now separated into multitude, and is able to impart itself to
other things, and which receives from others bound in itself, and
is sufficient in the distributions of partible natures, so as to
give completion to them ; which also participates of the primarily
operative and vivific, having communion with all real and
generated beings ; receives a commixture from all things, imparts
a contemperation to all things from itself, and extends these
peculiarities through all the powers, essences, and energies, in
itself; all this we shall truly ascribe to souls, by asserting
that it is naturally implanted in them.
* (pg. 31) For
εποχη here, I read
μετοχη.
CHAP. VI.
WHAT, therefore, shall we say concerning the
media? I think, indeed, that from what has been before said, they
will be manifest to every one ; for these give completion to the
indivisible connexion of the extremes. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to be more explicit. I consider, therefore, the
daemoniacal tribe to be multiplied, but, unitedly, to be comingled,
but in an unmingled manner, and to comprehend all other (35)
things of a subordinate nature, according to the idea of that
which is more excellent. But again, the tribe of heroes supernally
presides over a more obvious division and multitude, and likewise
over motion, commixture, and things allied to these. It also
receives gifts of a more excellent nature, concealed as it were
inwardly ; I mean union, purity, a firm establishment, impartible
sameness, and a transcendency above other things. For one of these
middle genera is proximate to the first, but the other to the
last, of the extremes. But it reasonably follows, according to
continuity of alliance, that the medium which begins from the most
excellent natures, should proceed to such as are less excellent ;
but that the medium which primarily produces a contact with the
last of things, should also in a certain respect communicate with
the natures that transcend it. From these media, also, the
completion may be seen of the first and last genera, and this
entirely connascent, in a similar manner, in existence, in power,
and in energy. As we have, therefore, in these two ways, perfectly
completed the division of the four genera, we shall deem it
sufficient in the others, to exhibit the extreme peculiarities
alone, for the sake of conciseness, and because what remains, i.
e. the comprehension of the media, is in a certain (36) respect
evident. But the media themselves, as being known from the
extremes, we shall omit ; making a definition of the extremes in
the shortest way, as follows.
CHAP. VII.
OF the extremes, therefore, one is supreme,
transcendent, and perfect ; but the other is last in dignity,
deficient, and more imperfect. And the former, indeed, is capable
of accomplishing all things at once, uniformly in an instant ; but
the latter is neither able to effect all things, nor at once, nor
suddenly, nor impartibly. The former also generates and governs
all things, without being inclined towards them ; but the latter
is naturally disposed to verge, and be converted to the things
which it generates and governs. And the former, indeed, as
primordial and cause, precedes all things in power ; but the
latter, being suspended from the will of the Gods, as from a
cause, is from eternity consubsistent with it. The former,
likewise, according to one vigorous acme, comprehends the ends of
all energies and essences ; but the latter passes from some things
to others, (37) and proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
Farther still, to the former that which is highest and that which
is incomprehensible pertain, and also that which is better than
all measure, and is in such a manner formless, as not to be
circumscribed by any form ; but the latter is vanquished by
inclination, habitude, and propensity ; and is detained by
appetites directed to that which is less excellent, and by
familiarity with secondary natures. Hence, in the last place, it
is formalized by all various measures derived from them.
Intellect, therefore, which is the leader and king of all beings,
and which is the demiurgic art of the universe, is always present
with the Gods with invariable sameness, perfectly, and without
indigence, being purely established in itself, according to one
energy. But soul participates of a partible and multiform
intellect, having its attention directed to the government of the
whole. It also providentially attends to inanimate natures,
becoming at different times ingenerated in different forms.
From the same causes, therefore, order and
beauty itself are consubsistent with the more excellent genera ;
or, if some one had rather admit it, the cause of these is
consubsistent with them. But with soul, the participation of
intellectual order and divine beauty is always present. And with
the former, indeed, the (38) measure of wholes, or the cause of
this, perpetually concurs. But soul is terminated by the divine
boundary, and participates of this in a partible manner. To the
former, also, empire over all beings, through the power and
domination of cause, may be reasonably ascribed. But soul has
certain distinct boundaries, as far as to which it is able to have
dominion. Such, therefore, being the different peculiarities in
the extremes, it will not be difficult to understand what we have
now said, and to perceive the middle peculiarities of daemons and
heroes, which are allied to each of the extremes, possessing a
similitude to each, departing from both to the medium, and
embracing a concordant communion comingled from them, and
connected with it in appropriate measures. Such, therefore, must
be conceived to be the peculiarities of the first divine genera.
CHAP. VIII.
BUT neither must we admit that cause of the
distinction of these genera which you subjoin, viz. "that it is
an corrangement with reference to different bodies; as, for
instance, (39) of Gods to etherial bodies, but of demons to aerial
bodies, and of souls to such as are terrene." For such an
arrangement as this, which resembles that of Socrates to a tribe,
when he is a senator, is unworthy of the divine genera, because
all of them are essentially unrestrained and free. To which may be
added, that it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a
principal power of giving a specific distinction to the first
causes of themselves. For bodies are in servile subjection to
these causes, and are ministrant to generation. And farther still,
the genera of the more excellent natures are not in bodies, but
the former externally rule over the latter. Hence they are not
changed in conjunction with bodies. Again, they impart from
themselves to bodies every such good as they are able to receive,
but they themselves receive nothing from bodies ; so that neither
will they derive from them certain peculiarities. For if they were
as the habits of bodies, or as material forms, or were in some
other way corporeal-formed, it would, perhaps, be possible for
them to be changed together with the differences of bodies. But if
they are separate from bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled
with them, what reasonable distinction, produced from bodies, can
be transferred to them? To which also may be (40) added, that this
assertion of yours makes bodies to be more excellent than the
divine genera, since the former afford a seat to superior causes,
and insert in them peculiarities essentially. He, therefore, who
coarranges allotments, distributions, and consociations of
governors with the governed, will evidently assign a principal
authority to more excellent natures. For, because the presiding
powers are such [as we have shown them to be], on this account
they have such an allotment, and give to it an essential specific
distinction, but they are not assimilated to the nature of their
receptacles.
It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of
this kind in partial souls. For such as is the life which the soul
received, prior to its insertion in a human body, and such as the
form which it readily exerted ; such also is the organical body
which it has suspended from itself, and such the consequent
corresponding nature, which receives the more perfect life of the
soul. But with respect to more excellent natures, and which, as
wholes, comprehend the principle [of parts] in these, inferior are
produced in superior natures ; bodies, in incorporeal essences ;
things fabricated, in the fabricators ; and, being circularly
comprehended in, are directed and governed by, them. Hence, (41)
the circulations of the celestial bodies, being primarily inserted
in the celestial circulations of the etherial soul, are
perpetually inherent in them ; and the souls of the worlds [i. e.
of the spheres], being extended to their intellect, are perfectly
comprehended by it, and are primarily generated in it. Intellect,
also, both that which is partial and that which is universal, is
in a similar manner comprehended in the genera that are more
excellent than intellect. Since, therefore, second are always
converted to first natures, and superior are the leaders of
inferior essences, as being the paradigms of them, hence essence
and form accede to subordinate from superior natures, and things
posterior are primarily produced in such as are more excellent; so
that order and measure are derived from primary to secondary
beings, and the latter possess that which they are from the
former. But the contrary must not be admitted, viz. that
peculiarities emanate from things less excellent to the natures
which precede them.
Hence, through these things such a corporeal
formed division as you introduce, is demonstrated to be false. It
is, indeed, especially necessary not to propose any thin;; of this
kind ; but if this should appear to you to be requisite, yet you
must not think, that what is (42) false deserves to be discussed.
For such a discussion does not exhibit a copiousness of arguments
; but he wearies himself in vain, who, proposing things that are
false, endeavours afterwards to subvert them, as things that are
not true. For how is it possible that an essence, which is of
itself incorporeal, and which has nothing in common with the
bodies that participate of it, should be distinguished from other
things by corporeal qualities? How can that which is not locally
present with bodies, be separated by corporeal places? And how can
that which is not inclosed by the partible circumscriptions of
subjects, be partibly detained by the parts of the world? What,
also, is that which can prevent the Gods from being every where?
And what can restrain their power from extending as far as to the
celestial arch? For to effect this, must be the work of a more
powerful cause, which is able to inclose and circumscribe them in
certain parts. But truly existing being, and which is essentially
incorporeal, is every where, where ever it may wish to be. And
that which is divine, and which transcends all things, would [if
what you say were admitted] be transcended by the perfection of
the whole world, and, as a certain part, would be comprehended by
it. Hence, it would be inferior to corporeal magnitude. (43) I do
not, however, see after what manner these sensible natures could
be produced and specifically distinguished, if there was no divine
fabrication, and if no participation of divine forms, extended
through the whole world.
In short, this opinion wholly subverts sacred
institutions, and the theurgic communion of the Gods with men ;
since it exterminates from the earth the presence of the more
excellent genera. For it says nothing else than that divine dwell
remote from earthly natures, and that this our place of abode is
deserted by them. According to this assertion, therefore, neither
can we, that are priests, learn any thing from the Gods, nor do
you rightly inquire of us, as knowing more than others, since we
shall differ in no respect from other men.
No one, however, of these assertions is sane.
For neither are the Gods detained in certain parts of the world,
nor are terrene natures destitute of their providential attention.
But the divinities are characterized by this, that they are not
comprehended by any thing, and that they comprehend all things in
themselves. But terrestrial natures possess their existence in the
pleromas* of the Gods ; and when they become adapted to
divine participation, then (44) prior to their own proper essence,
they immediately possess the Gods, which [latently] preexisted in
it.
Through these things, therefore, we have shown
that the whole of this division is false ; that the method
[employed by you] of investigating peculiarities is irrational ;
and that to suppose the government of the Gods is fixed in a
certain place, is by no means to apprehend the whole essence and
power which is in them. It would have been proper, therefore, to
have omitted the opposite inquiry made by you, about this
distribution of more excellent natures, as not contr |
